Chile is experiencing an interesting mutation within the very transformation that triggered the popular rebellion of 2019. With similar quotas of Baglini’s theorem, about the moderation imposed by proximity to power, and the verification of situations that are beyond expectations, the president Gabriel Boric, exponent of that popular rejection, regresses to a new realism.
Circumstances force it. Lately with the verification that there is no possible dialogue in the face of growing Mapuche violence or in the face of setbacks that surround or, at least, threaten the project of a new Constitution.
Boric has just suffered the worst political and ideological defeat so far in his government when he had to send his Minister of the Interior to announce that he will repeat the criteria of his predecessor, the right-wing Sebastián Piñera, declaring a constitutional exception for deploy troops in southern Chile. A decision that he had opposed since his campaign and that struck down as soon as he arrived in La Moneda.
The measure was masked with a supposed limitation to surveillance by the uniformed officers only of routes and paths in the area where Mapuche extremism commits its attacks. But the decree itself dilutes those brakes to the entire region and the infrastructure “if necessary.”
A precarious analysis would describe that move as a shift to the right by the government. But Boric is a pragmatic social democrat. She had already exposed that condition in November 2019 when, in the midst of a crisis due to street protests, she negotiated on her own with the Pinochet Independent Democratic Union to open the way to a Constituent Assembly before things got out of control.
In October of last year, the army deployed in Temuco. AFP photo
That pact morphed into a multi-party deal that Boric’s own supporters had branded as a betrayal. But that audacity was what preserved the system.
The interesting fact now about the bitter pill of the militarization of southern Chile is the gesture of authority that accompanies it. To rule in any case is to take charge. An obviousness that is not so clear in other borders of the region.
But this stance against his own ideas implies for Boric a growing perspective tension with the populist wings of his coalition, particularly the Communist Party, which provides him with a significant territorial base.
The PC, by the way, repudiates this measure with distances from a commentator. “This is not the time to involve the Armed Forces. in this conflict, which is political, social and involves some type of violent activity and would have an adverse reaction”, said the head of the communist party, Guillermo Tellier.
The Mapuche question is more than what it seems. It has had a strong political content. It was one of the flags of the political identity of this new leadership to differentiate itself from the right or center-right that governed Chilean destiny in recent decades, even in the face of the country’s moderate but rigorous European-style socialism.
Camila Vallejo, a firm ally of Boric, a PC militant and government spokesperson, in her days as a parliamentarian came to argue about this duel in the south that “when conflicts are handled like a war, there is no peace and only bloodshed… Use intelligence and not weapons”, he demanded..
The president himself, in his previous role as legislator, consistently rejected parliamentary authorization for the constitutional exception that Piñera demanded.
Boric came to power with the conviction of promoting a conclusive discussion with the native communities. In parallel, in addition, offering key signals such as the construction of a multinational vision of the country in the new Constitution .
A Mapuche protest in Temuco, in the Araucania region. AFP photo
But on the other side there was no interest in the negotiation. Interior Minister Izkia Siches was met with gunshots when newly assumed, he traveled to the Temucuicui community, in Ercilla, with his proposal for dialogue under his arm. That episode was the hallmark of how this dispute would progress.
The newspaper Thirdexplained that “in the ruling coalition they assure that La Moneda handles alarming figures regarding the increase in acts of violence in the area.”
On that frequency, the leader of the self-proclaimed Arauco Malleco Coordinator, Héctor Llaitul, took advantage of the government’s ingenuity with a call for “armed resistance” and disqualified Boric as “lackey” nothing less than the military dictatorship. A slam without mitigating.
The communist senator, Daniel Núñez, had to acknowledge his discomfort because these organizations did not give the slightest chance for the government to deploy their proposals. And he made a significant comparison by arguing that “when movements of an ethnic or nationalist nature become radicalized to the extreme, we reach dead ends, as happened in Spain, with the ETA.”
It was like this, millimeters from the characterization of terrorism from which Boric escapes with which they describe the forces of the center and especially of the right to what has been happening in those regions for years. In the harshest view, this conflict effectively has the format of a separatist war over a territory that includes a large part of Argentine Patagonia.
The other challenge that complicates Chile and the president himself due to the enormous deposit of political capital that he has invested, is the bumpy process of the Constitution. On September 4, a referendum will be held, the so-called “exit plebiscite” that will determine if the citizens agree with the content of the new Magna Carta.
President Gabriel Boric. Reuters Photo
But if that initiative had an exciting support of around 80% in October 2020, the latest polls (ie Pulso Ciudadano) indicate a rejection of 45.6%, with only 27.1% among those who would approve. Those who do not know compete with this last record with 27.4%. In the meantime, the distrust towards the conventional ones, far exceeds 50%.
The purpose of the new Charter, which should be concluded on July 5, is to replace the one bequeathed by the Pinochet dictatorship. The engine of this refoundation has been the demand to correct suffocating deformations in the chilean accumulation model of very high concentration and that filters the possibilities of education or health of the majorities.
But the constitutional project was born with a limp: the right-wing and center-left parties obtained a much lower representation than expected. The independents, who had achieved a broad block, a reflection of the repudiation of traditional politics, quickly dissolved. That fact meant a lot.
Those who remained operated with “the false illusion that this could be done without the right, without the center and part of the center left”, as pointed out to BBC the political activist Javiera Parada, who has been denouncing sectarianism and polarization in the process.
One of the initiatives that was approved without the support of the right or some representatives of the center left is, for example, the so-called “legal pluralism”, which allows the creation of courts for indigenous peoples that would coexist on an “equal plane” with the National Justice System. For his critics, naturally, this measure violates equality before the law.
The violence that plagues southern Chile adds a dose of contamination to initiatives of this kind, which are controversial in themselves and in a country where inflation and crime they demand priority attention before those other debates. Reasons, possibly, for the notable drop in Boric’s figure in the polls.
Another controversial proposal weighs down the management of the new Constitution, it is the decision of the conventionalists to end the 200-year existence of the Senate and crown in its place a kind of confused Chamber of Regions.
The center-right and the right, but also socialism, that is, more than half of the Chilean electorate, objected to this invention, which was even condemned as absurd by relevant figures such as Isabel Allende, the daughter of the mythical Salvador Allende.
These setbacks do not necessarily ensure the failure of the constitutional project. Even for many of his critics, voting against would imply the disappointment of keeping the Pinochet Charter in force. Boric bets on that discomfort to preserve the initiative. But a setback is not ruled out either as has just happened with the Mapuche conflict.
This uncertainty makes sense, it emerges from the novelty of a strong caution that was already noticeable since the national elections and that is moderating the message of the 2019 rebellion. But also, very importantly, to the children of that process. Nothing is like before. Neither are illusions. Grow up suddenly
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