Battle of Bakhmut in Ukraine: “The war of attrition is always more favorable to the defender than to the attacker”

Interview with Thibault Fouillet, expert in military strategy at the Foundation for Strategic Research.

The Ukrainian army wants to “reinforce” its positions in Bakhmut, refuting speculation about a withdrawal against Russian troops.

According to a statement by the Ukrainian presidency, made public on Monday, the commanders-in-chief of the Ukrainian forces have declared themselves “in favor of continuing the defensive operation.” But how far are the Ukrainians willing to go to defend the city? RFI consulted Thibault Fouillet, an expert on military strategy at the Foundation for Strategic Research.

-What is the objective of the Ukrainians in Bakhmut: to resist at all costs or to carry out an orderly withdrawal in time to avoid being surrounded?

– It is not possible to know the intentions of their staff, but it is likely that the Ukrainians are preparing a gradual withdrawal, which is what would seem logical and rational. Indeed, a siege would be disastrous not only because of the loss of men and material, but also because of what it implies in terms of image and trauma, as we saw for example in Mariupol. And this logic of withdrawing “at the last minute” has already been applied twice during the conflict, by both sides. The Russians did the same in Kherson and the Ukrainians did it when they defended the Severodonetsk-Lyssychansk pocket.

– So the objective would be to avoid a collapse while continuing to deplete the Russian forces?

That became the goal. But it wasn’t the initial target because Bakhmut has no fundamental strategic interest. It became a problem because it was the only area where the Russians could advance, and where they were concentrating their efforts. So the Ukrainians responded by trying to exhaust their capabilities for as long as possible, and repeat what happened with the Severodonestk salient.

Ukrainian soldiers fire artillery towards Russian positions near Bakhmut. Photo: AP

-If it happens, will the fall of Bakhmut be a key moment in the conflict?

-It will not be a key moment for two reasons. First of all, because the characteristic of this conflict is that it is a war of attrition that takes time… And even the most notable successes, such as the recapture of Kherson and the advance on Kharkov, at best only they lead to an operational breakthrough and not to the collapse of the adversary.

Second, because the capture of Bakhmut was of limited interest due to topography and geographical constraints. After Bakhmut, the Russians will face other urban areas and just go from one point to another. So it will be a political benefit to the Russians, who will use it as a big victory, but it won’t be anything really decisive operationally.

-You say that Bakhmut allows the Ukrainians to exhaust the Russian forces, but the opposite is also true: do the Ukrainians themselves exhaust themselves on Bakhmut?

-Of course, this is true for both sides and is a characteristic of a war of attrition. But exhaustion is always favorable to the defender and unfavorable to the attacker. From this point of view, the comparison with Verdun is pertinent, because during this World War I battle, both the Germans and the French were exhausted in terms of equipment and men. But, even so, the advantage was for the defender, because it broke the offensive momentum of the opponent. This is what the Ukrainians are looking for in Bakhmut: exhaust the Russians enough that they can’t go on with the next move.

-Since February 24 and the beginning of the invasion, there has been a pendulum swing: a series of Russian advances, and then a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Are we headed for a similar scenario in Bakhmut?

-It is difficult to say, but the certain thing is that this idea is present in the Ukrainian rhetoric. After the Russian February-March offensive would come a Ukrainian-led (boreal) spring offensive… And this dialectic has been quite favorable to the Ukrainians, as we saw with Kherson and Kharkov. I don’t know if this will translate into operational terms, but in rhetoric it is like this: the Russians on the offensive, and the Ukrainians who are already favoring or planning a counteroffensive for the following months.

– Is the battle of Bakhmut also a question of power within the Russian side itself, between Wagner’s mercenaries and the conventional army?

-We can see it in the friction in terms of communication, which was very strong, especially during the battles of Soledar and now Bajmut. With Wagner announcing certain advances that are later denied by the conventional army. And when Wagner announced advances, it was easy to understand the frustration this caused in the Russian army, since the strong support was, of course, his doing, not Wagner’s. There are even operational frictions, a lack of integration and direct cooperation. So, of course, there is a political interest and there is a war of political influence within the Russian forces fighting in this area.

RFI

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